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This paper  concerns  optimal  redistributive  non-linear  income  taxation  in  an  OLG  model,
where people  care  about  their  own  consumption  relative  to  (i)  other  people’s  current  con-
sumption,  (ii)  own  past  consumption,  and  (iii)  other  people’s  past consumption.  We  show
that  both  (i)  and  (iii)  affect  the  marginal  income  tax structure  whereas  (ii)  does  not.  We  also
derive conditions  under  which  atemporal  and  intertemporal  consumption  comparisons
give  rise  to  exactly  the same  tax policy  responses.  On  the  basis  of  the  available  empirical
estimates,  comparisons  with  other  people’s  current  and  past  consumption  tend to sub-
stantially  increase  the  optimal  marginal  labor  income  tax rates.  Yet,  such  comparisons  may
either increase  or decrease  the  optimal  marginal  capital  income  tax  rates.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. Open access under CC BY license.. Introduction
A rapidly growing body of evidence suggests that people have positional preferences in the sense of deriving utility from
heir own consumption relative to that of others.1 Alongside this development, a corresponding literature dealing with
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1 This includes evidence from happiness research (e.g., Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005;
lark  and Senik, 2010) and questionnaire-based studies (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). See
lso,  e.g., Marmot (2004) and Daly and Wilson (2009) for evidence based on physiological studies, and Fliessbach et al. (2007) and Dohmen et al. (2011) for
vidence  based on brain science. Bowles and Park (2005) and Oh et al. (2012) analyze variations in work hours between countries and over time, and ﬁnd
hat  social comparisons are important driving forces behind changes in work hours.
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optimal policy responses to positional concerns has evolved, showing that such concerns may  have a substantial effect on
the incentive structure underlying public policy. Within the literature on optimal income taxation,2 it has for example been
shown that social comparisons may  motivate substantially higher marginal income tax rates than without such comparisons;
see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990), Blomquist (1993), Ireland (2001),
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, 2013), Wendner and Goulder (2008) and Wendner (2010a).
Yet, almost all earlier studies on optimal policy responses to positional concerns that we are aware of assume that people
only make “atemporal” consumption comparisons, by valuing their own current consumption relative to other people’s
current consumption. A much more general approach has recently been presented by Rayo and Becker (2007). According
to their evolutionary model, selﬁsh genes would prefer that the humans they belong to are motivated by their own current
consumption relative to (i) their own past consumption, (ii) other people’s current consumption, and (iii) other people’s
past consumption. In the macroeconomic literature of dynamic consumption behavior, (i) corresponds to what is typically
denoted habit formation (sometimes denoted internal habit formation),  (ii) corresponds to keeping up with the Joneses, while
(iii) corresponds to catching up with the Joneses (sometimes denoted external habit formation).3 The present paper takes
these three types of consumption comparisons as a point of departure in a study of optimal income taxation in a dynamic
economy.4
We  develop and analyze an overlapping generations (OLG) model with endogenous labor supply and savings, where the
consumers are concerned with their relative consumption and where nonlinear taxes of labor income and capital income
are used for purposes of externality correction and redistribution. A dynamic model allows us to explore intertemporal
aspects of consumption comparisons, and provides a natural framework for studying capital income taxation. The latter
is important not least due to the difﬁculties of explaining the widespread use of capital taxes with conventional public
economics models. Earlier research shows that relative consumption concerns may  motivate such taxes (Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman, 2010), and one might perhaps conjecture such concerns to be particularly important when the concept
of relative consumption has more than one dimension, as we assume here.
The literature on optimal redistributive taxation under relative consumption concerns is scarce, and almost all earlier
studies are based on static models. The only exception that we  are aware of is Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010),
who analyze optimal nonlinear income taxation in a dynamic economy where each consumer compares his/her own  current
consumption with other people’s current consumption. Hence, their study neglects internal habit formation as well as the
catching up with the Joneses type of comparison mentioned above, and focuses solely on consumption comparisons based
on keeping up with the Joneses preferences. The present paper, in contrast, addresses the implications of such atemporal
comparisons for optimal income taxation simultaneously with the implications of relative consumption comparisons over
time. Another study related to ours is Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), who consider optimal labor income taxation in a dynamic
representative agent model where the consumer preference for relative consumption is driven by a catching up with the
Joneses motive. We  generalize their approach in several different ways by (1) considering a broader set of tax instruments,
(2) analyzing redistribution policy alongside externality correction, and (3) allowing keeping up and catching up with the
Joneses mechanisms to be operative simultaneously.
These extensions are important. In addition to the empirical evidence for between-people comparisons mentioned above,
there is evidence suggesting that people also make comparisons with their own past consumption (e.g., Loewenstein and
Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993); indeed, such comparisons were discussed already by Veblen (1899). It also
makes intuitive sense that old people compare their own consumption with several different reference levels, including
what they recall about their own and others’ consumption when they were young. Moreover, when growing up, most
people are likely to receive information from parents and grandparents about the consumption (and other living conditions)
characterizing earlier generations. The results from happiness studies have also documented that people’s happiness adapts
to income changes, consistent with the idea that the reference income increases over time when actual income increases; see,
e.g., Stutzer (2004) and Di Tella et al. (2010). Speciﬁcally, Senik (2009) presents recent estimates regarding the importance of
different kinds of comparisons over time, showing that subjective well-being is dependent on one’s own standard of living
2 Other issues dealt with include public good provision (Ng, 1987; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Wendner and Goulder, 2008; Wendner,
2014), social insurance (Abel, 2005), growth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997, 2001; Wendner, 2010b, 2011), environmental externalities (Howarth, 1996, 2006;
Brekke and Howarth, 2002; Wendner, 2005), stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000), distributional consequences (Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long,
2012) and tax evasion (Goerke, 2013). See also Frank (1999, 2005, 2007, 2008) for extensive and illuminating informal discussions of relative consumption
concerns and how the society should deal with them.
3 The notion “keeping up with the Joneses” is unfortunately used with different meanings in the literature. It is either used to indicate social comparisons
in  the sense that my utility depends in part on my current consumption relative to your current consumption, as in our case, or it is used with more
speciﬁc meanings, e.g., if you consume more now I will also consume more now. Similarly, the notion “catching up with the Joneses” may  either, as here,
simply mean that my utility today depends on my  current consumption relative to your previous consumption, or it may  reﬂect something more speciﬁc
such  that my consumption today increases with your previous consumption. No results in the present paper depend directly on the direction of people’s
consumption and leisure adjustment in response to a change in the reference consumption.
4 The macroeconomics literature referred to above rarely analyzes the optimal policy responses to the externalities induced by relative consumption
concerns. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Gomez (2006) are two  noteworthy exceptions.
r
s
a
o
l
t
f
i
p
a
c
t
t
c
r
o
o
a
c
m
J
a
p
v
t
I
t
t
c
p
a
t
o
m
s
r
t
s
a
2
u
c
c
2
S
i
p
CT. Aronsson, O. Johansson-Stenman / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 101 (2014) 1–23 3
elative to both internal and external reference points. Such comparisons are also consistent with the empirical pattern of
ome ﬁnancial puzzles,5 and (as mentioned) they are in line with recent research based on evolutionary models.
Section 2 presents the model and the outcome of private optimization. In Section 3, we  consider optimal income taxation in
 ﬁrst-best setting with full information about individual productivity, where the government can deal with its distributional
bjectives through lump-sum taxes. This provides a simple benchmark by which to compare our results with some earlier
iterature on optimal labor income taxation under positional concerns (which is based on similar models). Our results show
hat relative comparisons with one’s own past consumption (internal habit formation) do not directly affect the policy rules
or marginal income taxation (although they may, of course, inﬂuence the levels of marginal income tax rates). The intuition
s that such comparisons are fully internalized at the individual level and do not generate any externalities. However,
ositional concerns governed by comparisons with other people’s current and past consumption give rise to externalities
nd will, therefore, also directly affect the incentive structure underlying marginal income taxation. We show that positional
oncerns with respect to other people’s current and past consumption tend to increase the optimal marginal labor income
ax rates. We  also show how the marginal capital income tax rates are governed by differences in positional concerns over
he individual life cycle, where the relevant measure of reference consumption is again based on both the current and past
onsumption of others.
In general, positional concerns governed by other people’s past consumption give rise to much more complex policy
esponses than do comparisons based on other people’s current consumption. This is so because consumption comparisons
ver time give rise to an intertemporal chain reaction with welfare effects in the entire future, whereas comparisons with
ther people’s current consumption only lead to “atemporal externalities.” We  can nevertheless derive strong results for
 natural benchmark case in which the concerns for relative consumption are constant over time, implying that relative
onsumption comparisons over time (based on the catching up with the Joneses preferences) give rise to exactly the same
arginal tax rate responses as comparisons with other people’s current consumption (based on the keeping up with the
oneses preferences).
In practice, informational limitations are likely to prevent governments from using differentiated lump-sum taxation as
 basis for redistribution. Therefore, in Section 4, we  introduce asymmetric information between the government and the
rivate sector with respect to individual ability (worker productivity), where the public decision problem is described by a
ariant of the two-type optimal income tax model originally developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Although simple,
he two-type model provides a powerful framework for analyzing externality correction and redistribution simultaneously.
n such a second-best framework, tax distortions are the outcome of an optimal choice made by the government, subject
o informational limitations, and not of any arbitrary restrictions on the tax instruments (such as linearity) or the necessity
o raise revenue per se. Therefore, our approach enables us to capture that the optimal income tax responses to positional
oncerns may  involve purely corrective as well as redistributive elements.
In a second-best setting where ability is private information, there is also another policy incentive involved beyond
ositional externalities: the government may  relax the incentive constraint by exploiting differences in positional concerns
cross ability types. Our results show that while the externality-correcting mechanism unambiguously works to increase
he marginal labor income tax rates, independently of whether individuals compare their own current consumption with
ther people’s current or past consumption (or use a combination of these two  reference measures), the direction of the
echanism through the incentive constraint is ambiguous. We both present general optimal taxation results and derive
ufﬁcient conditions for when the overall net effect of positional concerns works to increase the marginal labor income tax
ates. Section 5 illustrates with a particular Cobb-Douglas functional form and shows, based on parameter estimates from
he literature, that positional preferences of both the keeping up with the Joneses and the catching up with the Joneses types
ubstantially increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper; proofs
re presented in the Appendix.
. Consumers, ﬁrms, and market equilibrium
We  start this section by describing the OLG framework and people’s preferences, followed by the deﬁnition of some
seful measures of the extent to which people care about relative consumption. We  then present the individual optimality
onditions for labor supply and savings, followed by the corresponding proﬁt maximization conditions for the ﬁrms and the
onditions for market equilibrium.
.1. The OLG framework and positional preferences
Consider an OLG model where each individual lives for two periods and works during the ﬁrst but not during the second.
ince each individual only works during the ﬁrst period of life, there is no evolution of productivity over time for a single
ndividual, as in Kocherlakota (2005), although we  allow for technical progress (discussed subsequently) that makes labor
roductivity increase over time. Individuals differ in ability, as measured by the before-tax wage rate. The number of
5 This includes various kinds of asset pricing puzzles, such as the equity premium puzzle; see, e.g., Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and
ochrane (1999), Chan and Kogan (2002), and Díaz et al. (2003).
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individuals of ability-type i in generation t, i.e., who  were born at the beginning of period t, is denoted nit . Each such individual
derives utility from his/her consumption when young, cit , consumption when old, x
i
t+1, and use of leisure when young, z
i
t ,
given by a time endowment normalized to one less the hours of work, lit (when old, all available time is leisure). For further
use, we deﬁne the average consumption in the economy as a whole in period t as c¯t =
[∑
in
i
tc
i
t +
∑
in
i
t−1x
i
t
]
/
∑
i
[
nit + nit−1
]
.
People also care about their own consumption relative to that of others.6 In accordance with the bulk of earlier comparable
literature, we focus on difference comparisons, where relative consumption is deﬁned by the difference between the indi-
vidual’s own consumption and a measure of reference consumption.7 The appropriate measure of reference consumption
at the individual level is, of course, an empirical question; yet, as indicated above, there is very little information available.
Our approach is to follow the recent contribution by Rayo and Becker (2007), who argue in the context of an evolutionary
model of happiness that the reference point of an individual might be determined by three components: (i) other people’s
current consumption, (ii) his/her own past consumption, and (iii) other people’s past consumption. In terms of our model,
we interpret these three components such that people care about four different kinds of relative consumption: the ﬁrst three
are their own current consumption relative to (i) the current average consumption such that cit − c¯t and xit+1 − c¯t+1 are the
corresponding measures of relative consumption when young and when old, respectively; (ii) their own consumption one
period earlier, i.e., xit+1 − cit; and (iii) the average consumption one period earlier such that cit − c¯t−1 and xit+1 − c¯t are the
corresponding measures of relative consumption when young and when old, respectively. In addition, following Rayo and
Becker (2007), we may  also allow for the change in relative consumption to matter, such that individual utility depends on
(xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t). This fourth comparison type is interpretable as habit formation in relative consumption (compared
with others’ current consumption), i.e., that the individual prefers increased relative consumption over time, ceteris paribus.
All in all, we can then write the utility function of ability-type i in generation t in terms of absolute consumption, leisure,
and six different relative consumption comparisons as follows:
Uit = Vit (cit, zit, xit+1, xit+1 − cit, cit − c¯t , xit+1 − c¯t+1, cit − c¯t−1, xit+1 − c¯t , (xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t)). (1a)
The function Vit (·) is assumed to be increasing in each argument, i.e., in leisure, absolute consumption when young and when
old, and the six measures of relative consumption.
However, note that the internal (habit-based) consumption comparison can be expressed in terms of cit and x
i
t+1, which
are decision variables of the individual. As such, we can without loss of generality rewrite Eq. (1a) as the following “reduced
form” function:
Uit = hit(cit, zit, xit+1, cit − c¯t , xit+1 − c¯t+1, cit − c¯t−1, xit+1 − c¯t , (xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t)), (1b)
where the internal habit formation component, xit+1 − cit , is now embedded in the effects of cit and xit+1. This implies that
the partial derivative of hit(·) with respect to cit reﬂects both the direct utility gain of increased absolute consumption when
young and the utility loss due to lower relative consumption when old compared to when young; correspondingly, the
partial derivative with respect to xit+1 reﬂects the direct utility gain of increased absolute consumption when old plus the
gain of increased consumption when old compared to when young. Therefore, all analytical results derived in a model where
individuals do not compare their own current and past consumption will continue to hold also in the case where people
make such comparisons. Intuitively, rational utility-maximizing individuals will internalize such comparisons perfectly, and
there is no externality involved in internal habit formation.8
Note also that the last component on the right-hand side of Eq. (1b), i.e., the change in the relative consumption over the
life cycle, is given by the difference between the ﬁfth (xit+1 − c¯t+1) and fourth (cit − c¯t) arguments, such that we can obtain a
further reduced form as follows:
i i i i i i i i iUt = vt(ct, zt, xt+1, ct − c¯t , xt+1 − c¯t+1, ct − c¯t−1, xt+1 − c¯t). (1c)
The intuition is that the effect of changed relative consumption over the life cycle, i.e., (xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t), is now embod-
ied in the effects through cit − c¯t and xit+1 − c¯t+1. Thus, if an individual derives utility from increased relative consumption
6 We follow earlier comparable literature in assuming that people do not care about their relative leisure; see Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) and Aronsson
and  Johansson-Stenman (2013) for analysis of the case where also relative leisure matters.
7 See, e.g., Akerlof (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and Alvarez-Cuadrado
and  Long (2011, 2012). Alternative approaches include ratio comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; Wendner and Goulder,
2008) and comparisons of ordinal rank (Frank, 1985; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, 2009). Dupor and Liu (2003) consider a ﬂexible functional form that
includes the difference and ratio comparisons as special cases. Mujcic and Frijters (2013) compare models with difference comparisons, ratio comparisons,
and  rank-based comparisons without being able to discriminate between them.
8 This approach is in principle innocuous as long as the government commits to its future tax policy, as we will assume below. Without such commitment,
internal habit formation may  inﬂuence the optimal tax structure in a second-best setting; see Guo and Krause (2011). However, whether people in reality do
internalize such adaptation perfectly is another matter. Loewenstein et al. (2003) analyze how systematic errors in anticipating adaptation processes affect
the  consumption-savings choices people make, and show that anticipation bias may  lead people to make decisions that are not in their own  best interest.
Tax  policy implications of anticipation bias are addressed by Aronsson and Schöb (2013), where the corrective policies that a paternalist government
may  undertake are embedded into a framework with redistribution under asymmetric information. Further exploration of the case with such bounded
rationality is a recommended task for future research.
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ver the life cycle, this will in Eq. (1c) be reﬂected in a larger partial derivative with respect to xit+1 − c¯t+1 and a smaller partial
erivative with respect to cit − c¯t , ceteris paribus. This has an important implication: analytical results derived based on Eq.
1c) hold irrespective of whether people derive utility from increased relative consumption over the life cycle. In the follow-
ng, and in order not to make the analysis overly complex, we will not deal with the effect through (xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t)
irectly but rely on the formulation in Eq. (1c). Instead, we  return to the effect of increased or decreased relative consumption
ver the life cycle when discussing interpretations and orders of magnitudes in Section 5.
For further use, note ﬁnally that the utility function can be rewritten as a “fully reduced form” often found in classic
xternality problems as follows:
Uit = uit(cit, zit, xit+1, c¯t−1, c¯t, c¯t+1). (1d)
q. (1d) can also be thought of as the most general formulation of the utility function, since it contains no information about
he structure of the social comparisons, beyond that others’ consumption levels cause negative externalities. We assume
hat the function vit(·) is increasing in each argument, meaning that uit(·) is decreasing in c¯t , c¯t−1, and c¯t+1, and that Eqs. (1c)
nd (1d) are twice continuously differentiable in their respective arguments and strictly concave.
As will be demonstrated, for some results we do not need any stronger assumptions regarding the preference structure
han in Eq. (1d). Yet, we need the more restrictive utility formulation based on the function vit(·) in Eq. (1c), where we specify
hat people care about additive comparisons, to establish a relationship between the optimal tax policy and the degree to
hich the utility gain from higher consumption is associated with increased relative consumption.9 The deﬁnition of such
easures is the issue to which we turn next.
.2. The degree of current versus intertemporal consumption positionality
Since much of the subsequent analysis is focused on relative consumption concerns, it is useful to introduce measures
f the degree to which such concerns matter for each individual. By using the function vit(·) in Eq. (1c), we  can deﬁne the
egree of current consumption positionality when young and when old, respectively, as
˛i,ct =
vi
t,cit−c¯t
vi
t,cit−c¯t
+ vi
t,cit−c¯t−1
+ vit,c
, (2a)
˛i,xt+1 =
vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t+1
vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t+1
+ vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t
+ vit,x
, (2b)
here subscripts attached to the utility function (except for the time indicator) denote partial derivatives, i.e., vit,c = ∂vit(·)/∂cit
nd similarly for the other terms. The variables ˛i,ct and ˛
i,x
t+1 are interpretable as the fraction of the overall utility increase
rom an additional dollar spent when young in period t and old in period t + 1, respectively, that is due to the increased
onsumption relative to other people’s current consumption (measured by the average consumption in the same period). As
ndicated above, these measures are also interpretable as if they accommodate the utility gain to the individual of increased
elative consumption over the life cycle.
By analogy, we can deﬁne the degree of intertemporal consumption positionality when young and when old, respectively,
s
ˇi,ct =
vi
t,cit−c¯t−1
vi
t,cit−c¯t
+ vi
t,cit−c¯t−1
+ vit,c
, (3a)
ˇi,xt+1 =
vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t
vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t+1
+ vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t
+ vit,x
(3b)
qs. (3a) and (3b) have interpretations similar to Eqs. (2a) and (2b), yet with the obvious modiﬁcation of reﬂecting consump-
ion comparisons over time: the variables ˇi,ct and ˇ
i,x
t+1 measure the fraction of the overall utility increase from an additional
ollar spent in period t and t + 1 (i.e., when young and when old), respectively, that is due to the increased consumption
elative to other people’s past consumption. By our earlier assumptions, 0 < ˛i,ct , ˛
i,x
t+1, ˇ
i,c
t , ˇ
i,x
t+1 < 1 for all t.
9 We do not attempt to explain why people care about relative consumption. We  do believe that signaling of some attractive characteristics constitutes
 likely reason why  people care about their own  consumption relative to that of others (cf. e.g. Ireland, 2001), but we still follow the considerably simpler
odeling strategy of simply assuming that people’s preferences directly depend on relative consumption.
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Let us next deﬁne the notions of the average degree of current consumption positionality and the average degree of intertem-
poral consumption positionality, which are given by
¯˛ t =
∑
i
˛i,xt
nit−1
Nt
+
∑
i
˛i,ct
nit
Nt
∈ (0,  1),  (4a)
¯ˇ t =
∑
i
ˇi,xt
nit−1
Nt
+
∑
i
ˇi,ct
nit
Nt
∈ (0,  1),  (4b)
respectively, where Nt =
∑
i[n
i
t−1 + nit]. Note that both ¯˛ t and ¯ˇ t are measured among those alive in period t.
2.3. The optimality conditions for individuals and ﬁrms
The consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint is summarized by the following two equations (for i = 1, 2):
witl
i
t − Tt(witlit) − sit = cit, (5a)
sit(1 + rt+1) − ˚t+1(sitrt+1) = xit+1, (5b)
where wit is the before-tax wage rate, implying that w
i
tl
i
t is the before-tax labor income, s
i
t is savings, rt+1 is the market interest
rate, and Tt(·) and ˚t+1(·) denote the payments of labor income and capital income taxes, respectively.10 Thus, consumption
levels when young are given by gross labor income net of labor income taxes and savings, whereas consumption levels when
old are given by the sum of savings and capital income net of capital income taxes.
Although the measures of reference consumption are endogenous in our model, we  assume that each individual treats
them as exogenous, which is the conventional equilibrium assumption in models with externalities. To be more speciﬁc,
and with reference to Eqs. (1) above, this means that ability-type i of generation t treats c¯t−1, c¯t , and c¯t+1 as exogenous. The
ﬁrst-order conditions for the hours of work and savings can then be written as
uit,cw
i
t[1 − T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t)] − uit,z = 0, (6)
−uit,c + uit,x[1 + rt+1[1 − ˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1)]] = 0, (7)
where uit,c = ∂uit/∂cit , uit,z = ∂uit/∂zit , and uit,x = ∂uit/∂xit+1, while T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) and ˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) are the marginal labor income tax
rate and marginal capital income tax rate, respectively.
The production sector consists of identical competitive ﬁrms producing a homogenous good with constant returns to
scale; the number of ﬁrms is normalized to one for notational convenience. Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman
(2010), the production function is given by
F(Lt, Kt; t) = g
(∑
i
iLit, Kt; t
)
, (8)
where Lit = nit lit is the total number of hours of work supplied by ability-type i in period t, Lt = [L1t , L2t , . . .]  is a vector whose
elements reﬂect the total number of work hours by each ability-type, Kt is the capital stock in period t, and i (for all i)
is a positive constant. The direct time dependency implies that we allow for exogenous technological change. Note that
the functional form assumption implicit in g(·) means that the relative wage rates, i.e., wjt/wkt = j/k for all j and k, are
ﬁxed. This assumption simpliﬁes the calculations in Section 4, where the public decision problem is affected by asymmetric
information between the government and the private sector, but is not important for the policy incentives created by relative
consumption comparisons (which are the major concerns here).
The ﬁrm obeys the necessary optimality conditions
FLi (Lt, Kt; t) =
∂g
∂
(∑
i
iLit
)i = wit for all i, (9)
FK (Lt, Kt; t) =
∂g
∂Kt
= rt . (10)
3. First-best taxationIn this section, we begin by specifying the social objective function, which is maximized subject to the overall resource
constraint. Then we present the results in terms of optimal taxation, starting with the case where the average positionality
degrees, population size, and the interest rate in the economy are all constant over time. This framework is technically
10 Note that both the labor and capital income taxation functions are nonlinear and may  include both intercept and slope parameters. For example, it
seems reasonable that the optimal labor income tax payment is negative at zero labor income.
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onvenient and allows us to characterize the basic policy incentives in an intuitive way. It also facilitates comparison with
arlier studies. Finally, we present the optimal taxation results for the more general model where these assumptions are
elaxed.
.1. The social decision problem
For convenience, as well as comparability with Section 4, we assume that there are two  types in each generation, type 1
nd type 2.11 The government faces a general intertemporal social welfare function as follows:
W = W(n10U10 , n20U20 , n11U11 , n21U21 , . . .), (11)
hich is increasing in each argument. Since the optimum conditions are expressed for any such social welfare function, they
re necessary optimum conditions for a Pareto-efﬁcient allocation.
Note that nonlinear taxation of labor and capital income allows the government to implement any desired combination
f consumption, savings, and work hours for each individual. Therefore, we  follow earlier literature on optimal nonlinear
ncome taxation in dynamic economies by formulating the public decision problem as a direct decision problem in terms
f private consumption, work hours, and the capital stock – an approach that will be particularly convenient in Section 4,
here we introduce asymmetric information between the government and the private sector.12 The marginal income tax
ates implicit in the optimal resource allocation can then be derived by combining the social ﬁrst-order conditions with the
rst-order conditions characterizing the private sector.
The resource constraint for the economy as a whole can be written as
F(Lt, Kt; t) + Kt −
∑
i
[
nitc
i
t + nit−1xit
]
− Kt+1 = 0, (12)
uch that production equals consumption plus investment in each period. We abstract from capital depreciation, since such
epreciation is of no signiﬁcance for the qualitative results derived below. The Lagrangian associated with the public decision
roblem then becomes
L = W +
∑
t
t
[
F(Lt, Kt; t) + Kt −
∑
i
[nitc
i
t + nit−1xit] − Kt+1
]
. (13)
ote ﬁnally that the government is assumed to treat the measures of reference consumption as endogenous, i.e., the govern-
ent recognizes and incorporates into its decision problem how the measures of reference consumption change in response
o public policy.
We  are concerned with the optimal tax policy implemented for any ability-type i of any generation t, which is based on
he social ﬁrst-order conditions for lit , c
i
t , x
i
t+1, and Kt+1. These social ﬁrst-order conditions are given by (for all i and t)
− ∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,z + tnitwit = 0, (14a)
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,c − tnit +
nit
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
= 0, (14b)
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,x − t+1nit +
nit
Nt+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
= 0, (14c)
t+1[1 + rt+1] − t = 0, (14d)
here we have used that wit = FLi (Lt, Kt; t) and rt = FK(Lt, Kt ; t) from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm. For notational con-
enience, we have written Eqs. (14b) and (14c) such that the left-hand side contains the partial derivative of the Lagrangian
ith respect to the appropriate measure of reference consumption, i.e., the measure of reference consumption that is affected
y a change in cit and x
i
t+1, respectively. The derivative ∂L/∂c¯t will be referred to as the positionality effect in period t and
lays a crucial role in the subsequent analysis of optimal taxation..2. Optimal ﬁrst-best taxation with constant average positionality degrees
Let us start with some less general assumptions than those outlined above, and more speciﬁcally that:
11 We show in an earlier version of the paper that all results in this section are straightforward to generalize to an arbitrary number of types.
12 See, e.g., Brett (1997) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010).
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i. The population size is constant over time, such that Nt = N for all t.
ii. The average (current and intertemporal) degrees of positionality are constant over time, such that ¯˛ t = ¯˛  and ¯ˇ t = ¯ˇ for
all t.
iii. The interest rate is constant over time, such that rt = r for all t.
Although these assumptions of course reﬂect limitations, similar (or stronger) assumptions are typically made in the
“catching up with the Joneses” literature, where one also often assumes speciﬁc functional forms; see, e.g., Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) and Díaz et al. (2003). It should also be noted that the model is still general enough to reﬂect different
preferences between types, including different positionality degrees.
Assumption (iii) above implies from Eq. (14d) that  t+k =  t/[1 + r]k. This special case, which makes it easy to relate our
results to ﬁndings in earlier literature, is either interpretable in terms of a steady state13 – provided that a steady state exists
– or may  follow as a consequence of adding additional assumptions about the preferences and technology (see Section 5).
Now, let us deﬁne the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality, in present value terms, as follows:
¯ = ¯˛  +
¯ˇ
1 + r .
Intuitively, ¯ reﬂects the overall social loss of consuming an additional dollar today, due to the associated increase in
current and future reference consumption levels. The ﬁrst term, ¯˛ , reﬂects the part of this loss that will occur through
current consumption positionality, whereas the second term, ¯ˇ /[1 + r], reﬂects the loss due to intertemporal consumption
positionality. The reason why the latter loss is discounted is, of course, that it will occur in the next period. We  can then
derive
∂L
∂c¯t
= −Nt ¯˛  +
¯ˇ / [1 + r]
1 − ¯˛ − ¯ˇ / [1 + r]
= −Nt ¯1 − ¯ (15)
Although intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to welfare costs in the future (as will be shown explicitly in
Section 3.3), the forward-looking component reduces to a single variable under assumptions i-iii, which explains the simple
form of Eq. (15). Using Eqs. (6), (7), (14a)–(14d) and (15), we  are ready to present the following benchmark results:
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (i)–(iii), the ﬁrst-best marginal labor and capital income tax rates, respectively, can be written
as (for i = 1, 2)
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = ¯ > 0, (16)
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) = 0. (17)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
To interpret Proposition 1, note ﬁrst that since the government may  reach its distributional objectives by using lump-
sum taxes/subsidies, there is no distributional reason for using distortionary taxation. As such, the non-zero marginal labor
income tax rates are solely due to the externalities that positional concerns give rise to. By analogy to earlier comparable
literature (see Section 1), we ﬁnd that positional concerns motivate positive marginal labor income tax rates. The novelty
here is that the marginal labor income tax rate is given by the average degree of time-inclusive positionality; there are
no additional effects associated with the two separate components ¯˛  and ¯ˇ /(1 + r). This has a strong implication: current
positionality (reﬂecting the keeping up with the Joneses motive) and intertemporal positionality (reﬂecting the catching up
with the Joneses motive) affect the marginal labor income tax rates in exactly the same way. Note also that Eq. (16) nests
corresponding results derived by, e.g., Dupor and Liu (2003) (where ¯ = ¯˛  and T ′t (witlit) = ¯˛ ) and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000)
(where ¯ = ¯ˇ /(1 + r) and T ′t (witlit) = ¯ˇ /(1 + r)).14
Second, capital income taxation plays no corrective role here. The intuition is that the positionality effects in periods t
and t + 1 cancel out. Therefore, as long as assumptions (i)–(iii) hold, the marginal capital income tax rates are zero in the ﬁrst
best, irrespective of whether the consumers have keeping up or catching up with the Joneses preferences (or a mix  of them).
3.3. Optimal ﬁrst-best taxation with time-varying degrees of positionality
As indicated above, the optimal tax policy depends on the consumption externalities, which in turn depend on the
positionality effect. As long as we made the simplifying assumptions (i)–(iii), both the positionality effect and the optimal
13 This requires that the preferences and technology do not change over time, and that the economy approaches a stationary equilibrium in which lit , c
i
t ,
xit (for all i), and Kt all remain constant over time.
14 Ljungqvist and Uhlig use a model with inﬁnite time horizons to describe the consumer behavior, and assume that the reference consumption relevant
today  is a geometric average of the consumption in earlier periods. The result discussed above refers to their special case where the reference consumption
is  given by the average consumption in the previous period. The study by Dupor and Liu is based on a static model.
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arginal income tax formulas became simple and easily interpretable. Not surprisingly, when relaxing these assumptions,
hings become more complex. The positionality effect is now given by:
∂L
∂c¯t
= −Ntt ¯˛ t
1 − ¯˛ t −
Nt+1t+1 ¯ˇ t+1
1 − ¯˛ t −
∞∑
k=1
[
Nt+kt+k ¯˛ t+k
1 − ¯˛ t+k
+ Nt+k+1t+k+1
¯ˇ
t+k+1
1 − ¯˛ t+k
]
Dt,k < 0, (18)
here
Dt,k =
k∏
j=1
¯ˇ
t+j/(1 − ¯˛ t+j−1) > 0.
q. (18) comprises three distinct negative effects. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side, −Ntt ¯˛ t/(1 − ¯˛ t) < 0, measures the
irect welfare loss in period t of an increase in c¯t; the intuition is that an increase in c¯t , ceteris paribus, leads to lower utility
or all consumers via the argument cit − c¯t in the function vit(·) in Eq. (1c). This effect depends on the average degree of current
ositionality. The analogous second term, −Nt+1t+1 ¯ˇ t+1/(1 − ¯˛ t) < 0, is interpretable as the direct welfare loss in period
 + 1 of an increase in c¯t , and the underlying mechanism here is that c¯t affects individual utility negatively via the argument
i
t+1 − c¯t in the function vit(·). This effect captures the intertemporal consumption externality and depends on the average
egree of intertemporal positionality.
Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (18) reﬂects an intertemporal chain reaction. The intuition is that the
ntertemporal aspect of the consumption comparisons, i.e., that other people’s past consumption affects utility, means that
he welfare effects of changes in the reference consumption are not time-separable (as they would be without intertem-
oral comparisons). This is so because a change in the reference consumption today means behavioral adjustments in the
uture, which in turn inﬂuence the reference consumption levels relevant for future generations. As such, when we relax
ssumptions (i)–(iii) in the previous subsection, the welfare costs of intertemporal consumption comparisons can no longer
e summarized by a single variable. In the absence of relative comparisons over time, i.e., if ¯ˇ t = 0 for all t, the right-hand
ide of Eq. (18) collapses to −Ntt ¯˛ t/(1 − ¯˛ t), which takes the same form as Eq. (15).
Before presenting the optimal marginal income tax rates, deﬁne the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
rivate consumption in period t, MRSi,tz,c = uit,z/uit,c , and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in periods
 and t + 1, MRSi,tc,x = uit,c/uit,x, for ability-type i of generation t, and let 1 + t+1 = Nt+1/Nt denote the population growth factor.
he optimal tax structure can then be characterized as follows:
roposition 2. The ﬁrst-best marginal income tax rates faced by ability-type i can be written as (for i = 1, 2)
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = −
MRSi,tz,c
twitNt
∂L
∂c¯t
> 0, (19)
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) =
1
t+1rt+1Nt
[
∂L
∂c¯t
− MRS
i,t
c,x
1 + t+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
]
(20)
roof. See the Appendix. 
Again, since the government may  reach its distributional objectives by using lump-sum taxes/subsidies, there is no
istributional reason for using distortionary taxation, and the non-zero marginal labor income tax rates are therefore solely
ue to the negative externalities that positional concerns give rise to. Therefore, the marginal labor income tax rates are
ositive for all types. Yet, since the positionality effects become very complex in the case where the average positionality
egrees vary over time, it is not possible to express the optimal marginal labor income tax rates in a simple way in terms of
he degrees of positionality.
To interpret Eq. (20), note that the marginal capital income tax rates reﬂect a desired tradeoff for society between present
nd future consumption. As a consequence, the right-hand side of Eq. (20) is decomposable into two parts (in Section 3.2,
hese two parts canceled out due to assumptions (i)–(iii). The basic intuition is that each individual generates positional
xternalities both when young and when old. Therefore, whether positional concerns lead to a positive or negative marginal
apital income tax rate in period t + 1 depends on the difference between the positionality effect in period t and the discounted
ositionality effect in period t + 1. Again, this result holds regardless of whether the preferences for relative consumption
re governed by a keeping up or catching up with the Joneses motive, or by a mix  of them.
.4. Brieﬂy on age-speciﬁc consumption comparisonsThe analysis carried out so far assumes that each individual compares his/her consumption with economy-wide averages,
.e., the relevant measures of reference consumption are given by the average consumption in the present period (for the
eeping up with the Joneses comparison) and average consumption in the previous period (for the catching up with the
oneses comparison), respectively. Although mean-value comparisons are very common in earlier comparable studies on tax
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and other policy implications of relative consumption concerns,15 empirical evidence suggests that people may  use more
narrow social reference groups based on similarities (e.g., Runciman, 1966; McBride, 2001). Following McBride (2001), we
brieﬂy examine how the results may  change if each consumer compares his/her own  consumption with that of other persons
of the same age (instead of with economy-wide averages).16
Deﬁne the average consumption among the young and old alive in period t as follows:
c¯youngt =
∑
in
i
tc
i
t∑
in
i
t
and x¯oldt =
∑
in
i
t−1x
i
t∑
in
i
t−1
.
Eq. (1c) is then replaced with
Uit = vit(cit, zit, xit+1, cit − c¯
young
t , x
i
t+1 − x¯oldt+1, cit − c¯
young
t−1 , x
i
t+1 − x¯oldt ) for i = 1, 2. (1c′)
Based on Eq. (1c′), the degrees of current positionality characterizing ability-type i of generation t (who is young in period t
and old in period t + 1) are given by
˛i,youngt =
vi
t,ci
t
−c¯young
t
vi
t,ci
t
−c¯young
t
+vi
t,ci
t
−c¯young
t−1
+vit,c
,
˛i,oldt+1 =
vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t+1
vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t+1
+ vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t
+ vit,x
,
when young and old, respectively, while the corresponding degrees of intertemporal positionality become
ˇi,youngt =
vi
t,cit−c¯
young
t−1
vi
t,cit−c¯
young
t
+ vi
t,cit−c¯
young
t−1
+ vit,c
,
ˇi,oldt+1 =
vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t
vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t+1
+ vi
t,xi
t+1−x¯
old
t
+ vit,x
.
We can then deﬁne average degrees of current and intertemporal positionality such that
¯˛ youngt =
∑
i
nit˛
i,young
t∑
i
nit
, ¯˛ oldt =
∑
i
ni
t−1˛
i,old
t∑
i
ni
t−1
, ¯ˇ youngt =
∑
i
nitˇ
i,young
t∑
i
nit
, and ¯ˇ oldt =
∑
i
ni
t−1ˇ
i,old
t∑
i
ni
t−1
.
The general case with time-varying average degrees of positionality provides little insight beyond those presented in Section
3.3. Let us, therefore, return to the special case examined in Section 3.2, which was based on (the additional) assumptions
(i)–(iii), and also modify assumption (ii) such that the average positionality degrees when comparing with others of the same
age are constant over time, i.e., ¯˛ youngt = ¯˛ young, ¯˛ oldt = ¯˛ old, ¯ˇ youngt = ¯ˇ young and ¯ˇ oldt = ¯ˇ old for all t. Finally, and by analogy
to the analysis carried out above, deﬁne average degrees of time-inclusive positionality based on the positionality concept
examined here
¯young = ¯˛ young +
¯ˇ young
1 + r and ¯
old = ¯˛ old +
¯ˇ old
1 + r
It is now straightforward to show that the optimal tax policy summarized by Eqs. (16) and (17) in Proposition 1 is modiﬁed
as follows:
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = ¯young > 0, (16′)
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) =
1 + r
r
(1 − ¯old)
(
¯old
1 − ¯old −
¯young
1 − ¯young
)
. (17′)In the Appendix, we brieﬂy describe how Eqs. (16′) and (17′) are derived. The intuition behind Eqs. (16′) and (17′) follows
by observing that age-speciﬁc comparisons allow for a distinction between average degrees of time-inclusive positionality
among the young and old. Therefore, since only young individuals supply labor in this model, the marginal labor income
15 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) constitutes a recent exception, where the optimal tax policy implications of upward and within-generation
comparisons (in addition to mean value comparison) are addressed. Yet, that study only allows the consumers to compare their current consumption
with  other people’s current consumption (i.e., keeping up with the Joneses), irrespective of whether the measures of reference consumption are deﬁned
to  accommodate mean-value, upward-, or within-generation comparisons.
16 We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this extension. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012) use an OLG-model and heterogeneous agents
with  relative comparisons of this kind to derive several interesting results, in particular regarding distributional effects due to social comparisons.
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ax rate equals the average degree of time-inclusive positionality among the young, which reﬂects the externality that each
oung consumer imposes on his/her referent others.
The marginal capital income tax rate typically differs from zero, and its sign depends on whether the old consumers are,
n average, more or less positional than their young counterparts. This result accords well with the general characterization
n Section 3.3, and is here expressed in terms of the difference in the average degree of time-inclusive positionality between
he old and the young age groups (while there was  no such difference in Section 3.2). Clearly, when these measures of time-
nclusive positionality are the same for the young and the old, such that ¯old = ¯young, it follows that the optimal marginal
apital income tax is zero.
Finally, note that the optimal marginal income tax rates are also in this case fully characterized by average degrees of
ime-inclusive positionality. Once again, therefore, relative consumption concerns based on comparisons with other people’s
urrent and past consumption affect the marginal income tax structure in exactly the same way.
. Optimal second-best taxation
In reality, governments are not likely to be able to redistribute on a lump-sum basis, since individual ability is private
nformation. This may, in turn, have important implications for how the tax system should be used in response to positional
oncerns. In this section, we will generalize the ﬁndings obtained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 to the case where asymmetric
nformation prevents redistribution through lump-sum taxes.
.1. The social decision problem
As before, there are two types of individuals, but we now explicitly state that individuals of type 1 are less productive
han those of type 2 (measured in terms of the before-tax wage rate), and refer to type 1 as the “low-ability type” and type
 as the “high-ability type.” Following the convention in earlier literature on optimal nonlinear taxation, we assume that
he government is able to observe income, that ability (and, consequently, work hours) is private information, and that
he government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. To prevent the high-ability type from
ecoming a mimicker, we impose the following self-selection constraint:
U2t = u2t (c2t , z2t , x2t+1, c¯t−1, c¯t, c¯t+1)≥u2t (c1t , 1 − l1t , x1t+1, c¯t−1, c¯t, c¯t+1) = Uˆ2t , (21)
hich means that any high-ability type individual weakly prefers the allocation intended for his/her type over the allocation
ntended for the low-ability type. The variable  = w1t /w2t = 1/2 < 1 denotes the wage ratio, which is a constant by the
ssumptions about the technology made earlier. The left-hand side of the weak inequality in (21) measures the utility faced
y the high-ability type if revealing his/her true ability, while the right-hand side represents the utility of the high-ability
imicker, i.e., a high-ability type who chooses the same income-consumption points as the low-ability type. Although the
imicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type in each period, he/she reaches this consumption with less
ork-effort implying more leisure (1 − l1t > z1t denotes the mimicker’s leisure).17
The social welfare function, production technology, and resource constraint are the same as in Section 3. Therefore, the
agrangian can be written as
L = W +
∑
t
t[U2t − Uˆ2t ] +
∑
t
t
[
F(Lt, Kt; t) + Kt −
2∑
i=1
[nitc
i
t + nit−1xit] − Kt+1
]
, (22)
here t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint faced by generation t. As above, the gov-
rnment treats the measures of reference consumption as endogenous.
Following the bulk of earlier literature on optimal nonlinear income taxation in dynamic economies, we assume that the
overnment commits to its future tax policy.18 Let uˆ2t = u2t (c1t , 1 − l1t , x1t+1, c¯t−1, c¯t, c¯t+1) denote the utility of the mimicker
ased on the utility formulation in Eq. (1d). The direct decision variables relevant for generation t are l1t , c
1
t , x
1
t+1, l
2
t , c
2
t , x
2
t+1,
nd Kt+1, and the social ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
− ∂W
∂(n1t U
1
t )
n1t u
1
t,z + tuˆ2t,z + tn1t w1t = 0, (23a)
∂W n1 ∂L∂(n1t U
1
t )
n1t u
1
t,c − tuˆ2t,c − tn1t + tNt ∂c¯t
= 0, (23b)
17 Given the set of available policy instruments assumed here, it is possible for the government to control the present and future consumption as well as
he  hours of work of each ability type. As a consequence, in order to be a mimicker, the high-ability type must mimic the labor income and capital income
f  the low-ability type, and thus consume the same amount as the low-ability type in both periods.
18 See Brett (1997), Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), Aronsson et al. (2009), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). For recent studies of time-consistent
ptimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment, see Brett and Weymark (2008) and Guo and Krause (2011). See also Acemoglu et al. (2011) for a
olitical economy model with taxation of capital and labor when self-interested politicians cannot commit to future policies.
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∂W
∂(n1t U
1
t )
n1t u
1
t,x − tuˆ2t,x − t+1n1t +
n1t
Nt+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
= 0, (23c)
−
[
∂W
∂(n2t U
2
t )
n2t + t
]
u2t,z + tn2t w2t = 0, (23d)
[
∂W
∂(n2t U
2
t )
n2t + t
]
u2t,c − tn2t +
n2t
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
= 0, (23e)
[
∂W
∂(n2t U
2
t )
n2t + t
]
u2t,x − t+1n2t +
n2t
Nt+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
= 0, (23f)
t+1[1 + rt+1] − t = 0, (23g)
where (as before) uit,c = ∂uit/∂cit , uit,z = ∂uit/∂zit , and uit,x = ∂uit/∂xit+1, and where ∂L/∂c¯t denotes the positionality effect in
period t, i.e., the partial welfare effect of an increase in c¯t . For further use, we deﬁne the following measures of differences
in the degree of current and intertermporal positionality, respectively, between the mimicker and the low-ability type in
period t:
˛dt =
t−1uˆ2t−1,x
tNt
[ ˆ˛ 2,xt − ˛1,xt ] +
tuˆ2t,c
tNt
[ ˆ˛ 2,ct − ˛1,ct ], (24a)
ˇdt =
t−1uˆ2t−t,x
tNt
[ ˆˇ 2,xt − ˇ1,xt ] +
tuˆ2t,c
tNt
[ ˆˇ 2,ct − ˇ1,ct ], (24b)
where the symbol “ˆ’’ denotes “mimicker” (as before), while the super-script “d” stands for “difference.” Note that ˛dt and
ˇdt reﬂect positionality differences between the young mimicker and the young low-ability type, and between the old
mimicker and the old low-ability type, respectively. Note also that the variables ˛dt and ˇ
d
t are related to the self-selection
constraint, since each component in Eqs. (24a) and (24b), respectively, is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier of the
self-selection constraint (either the constraint facing generation t − 1 or the constraint facing generation t). As such, ˛dt and
ˇdt are fundamentally related to the second-best framework with asymmetric information set out here (they would vanish
in a ﬁrst-best economy, where t = 0 for all t).
4.2. Optimal second-best taxation and time-invariant positionality degrees
Consider ﬁrst the second-best analog to the stationary regime addressed in Section 3.2, where the degrees of positionality
are constant over time. This special case facilitates comparison with earlier literature on optimal second-best taxation under
relative consumption as well as provides straightforward (second-best) analogs to Eqs. (16) and (17). Therefore, and by
analogy to Section 3.2, let us again make assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii), such that, for all t, Nt = N, ¯˛ t = ¯˛ , ¯ˇ t = ¯ˇ ,  and rt = r, and
in addition make the following assumption:
iv. The indicators of positionality differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type are constant over time in the
sense that ˛dt = ˛d and ˇdt = ˇd for all t.
As before, this case is either interpretable in terms of a steady state or may  follow as a consequence of adding additional
assumptions about the preferences and technology. By analogy to the average degree of time-inclusive consumption posi-
tionality deﬁned in Section 3.2, i.e., ¯ = ¯˛  + ¯ˇ /(1 + r), we deﬁne the difference in the time-inclusive degree of consumption
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type (also in present value terms) as
d = ˛d + ˇ
d
1 + r .
We can then express the positionality effect, which characterizes the partial welfare effect of an increase in c¯t , as
∂L
∂c¯t
= −Nt ¯ − 
d
1 − ¯ . (25)With Eq. (25) at our disposal, we can relate the marginal income tax rates to the average degree of time-inclusive consumption
positionality and to the difference in this measure of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. Starting
with the marginal labor income tax rates, we combine Eqs. (6), (23a), (23b) and (25) to derive the marginal labor income tax
rate faced by the low-ability type, and Eqs. (6), (23d), (23e) and (25) to derive the marginal labor income tax rate faced by
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he high-ability type. To simplify the notations, we  use 	1t and 	
2
t to denote the optimal marginal labor income tax rates in
he original Stiglitz (1982) model, i.e., the expressions that would follow in the absence of relative consumption concerns:
	1t =
∗t
w1t n
1
t
[MRS1,tz,c − MRˆS2,tz,c ] and 	2t = 0,
where ∗t = tuˆ2t,c/t and MRˆS2,tz,c = uˆ2t,z/uˆ2t,c.
e can then characterize the marginal labor income tax rates as follows:
roposition 3. Under assumptions (i)–(iv), the second-best marginal labor income tax rate can, for each ability type, be written
n the following additive form (for i = 1, 2):
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = 	it + [1 − 	it] ¯ − [1 − 	it][1 − ¯]
d
1 − d . (26)
roof. See the Appendix. 
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the expression for marginal labor income taxation that would follow in the standard
ptimal income tax model and is well understood from earlier research (Stiglitz, 1982).19 The second term measures the
arginal external cost of consumption as reﬂected by the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality,
lthough its contribution to the marginal labor income tax rates is modiﬁed compared with the ﬁrst-best formula given
y Eq. (16). The intuition is that the fraction of marginal income that is already taxed away does not give rise to positional
xternalities. Therefore, if 	1t > 0, this “second-best modiﬁcation” tends to reduce the externality-correcting component in
he formula for the low-ability type.
The third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (26) reﬂects the self-selection constraint. Suppose ﬁrst that d > 0, meaning
hat the mimicker has a higher degree of time-inclusive positionality than the low-ability type. In this case, increased
eference consumption gives rise to a larger utility loss for the mimicker than for the low-ability type. The government may
hen relax the self-selection constraint through a tax policy that leads to increased reference consumption, i.e., through lower
arginal labor income tax rates.20 Correspondingly, if d < 0, increased reference consumption tightens the self-selection
onstraint such that the third term on the right-hand side contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rate.
Eq. (26) also reveals that the average degree of current positionality, ¯˛ , and the present value of the average degree of
ntertemporal positionality, ¯ˇ /(1 + r), affect each marginal labor income tax rate in exactly the same way. The same applies
o the measures of positionality differences, i.e., ˛d and ˇd/(1 + r). Special cases of Eq. (26) are derived by Aronsson and
ohansson-Stenman (2010), where the preferences for relative consumption are based solely on the keeping up with the
oneses motive ( ¯ = ¯˛  and d = ˛d), and by Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), where the consumption comparisons are based on
he catching up with the Joneses motive and there is no asymmetric information ( ¯ = ¯ˇ /(1 + r) and d = 0).
Turning to the capital income tax structure, we can derive the marginal capital income tax rate implemented for the
ow-ability type by combining Eqs. (7), (23b), (23c), (23g) and (25), and the marginal capital income tax rate implemented
or the high-ability type by combining Eqs. (7), (23e), (23f), (23g) and (25). To simplify the presentation of the results, let
i
t denote the expression for marginal capital income taxation of ability type i that would follow in the absence of relative
onsumption concerns, where
ı1t =
tuˆ2t,x
t+1n1t rt+1
[MRS1,tc,x − MRˆS2,tc,x] and ı2t = 0.
e can then derive the following result:
roposition 4. Under assumptions (i)–(iv), the second-best marginal capital income tax rate can, for each ability type, be written
s (for i = 1, 2):
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) =
1 − ¯
d
ıit . (27)1 − 
roof. See the Appendix. 
The variable ıit on the right-hand side of Eq. (27), which would also be present in a standard two-type model without
onsumption externalities, is due to the self-selection constraint and is well understood and explained in earlier research (e.g.,
19 For the low-ability type, this component is typically positive (at least if the consumers share a common utility function), while it is zero for the high-
bility type due to that the relative wage rate is constant. The intuition is that the government may  relax the self-selection constraint by taxing low-ability
abor, since the low-ability type attaches a higher marginal value to leisure than the mimicker, whereas no such option exists for the high-ability type.
20 Thus, if d is positive and sufﬁciently large, relative consumption concerns may  actually contribute to reduce the marginal labor income tax rates
although this scenario seems unlikely).
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Brett, 1997).21 As in Section 3.2, there is no direct effect of relative consumption concerns in Eq. (27) since the positionality
effects in periods t and t + 1 largely cancel out when the degrees of positionality are constant over time. Yet, there is a second-
best adjustment of the marginal capital income tax rate faced by the low-ability type due to positional concerns, which was
not present in Section 3.2. Consider the case where MRS1,tc,x > MRˆS
2,t
c,x , in which the mimicker values an additional dollar today
in terms of consumption tomorrow less than does the low-ability type, implying that ı1t > 0 and ˚
′
t+1(s
1
t rt+1) > 0. The term
1 − ¯ then serves to reduce the effect that ı1t would otherwise have on the marginal capital income tax rate, since capital
income taxation leads to an increase in c¯t and, therefore, in the externality that c¯t gives rise to. The effect through 1 − d in
the denominator is because increased reference consumption may  either relax (d > 0) or tighten (d < 0) the self-selection
constraint, depending on whether a mimicking high-ability type is more or less positional than the low-ability type in terms
of time-inclusive positionality. Analogous results and interpretations hold for the case where MRS1,tc,x < MRˆS
2,t
c,x .
It is easy to see that all qualitative results in this subsection hold in the special case without consumption comparisons
over time, i.e., where ¯ = ¯˛  and d = ˛d, which is the case addressed by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). Similarly,
all qualitative results hold in the other extreme situation where ¯ = ¯ˇ /(1 + r) and d = ˇd/(1 + r), in which there are no
comparisons with other people’s current consumption.
4.2.1. When the optimal capital income taxes vanish
An important issue in the literature on capital income taxation is to determine conditions for when it is optimal not to use
such taxes. In this brief subsection, we add some further assumptions that together are sufﬁcient for an optimal tax structure
without capital income taxes. In doing so, we will relate to a classical result by Ordover and Phelps (1979), regarding when it
is optimal not to use capital taxation at all on the margin. From Proposition 4, it is straightforward to derive such conditions
also in our model. The following result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4:
Corollary 1. Under assumptions (i)–(iv), and if leisure is weakly separable from private consumption in the sense that Uit =
qit(ft(c
i
t, x
i
t+1, c
i
t − c¯t , xit+1 − c¯t+1, cit − c¯t−1, xit+1 − c¯t), zit) describes the utility function, both optimal marginal capital income tax
rates are zero.
This result follows from acknowledging that the mimicker and the low-ability type differ only with respect to pre-
ferences and use of leisure. Given the assumption that leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in the utility
function, and that the consumers share a common sub-utility function ft(·), it follows that MRS1,tc,x = MRˆS2,tc,x , implying
that both marginal capital income tax rates are equal to zero according to Eq. (27). The quite remarkable consequence
of Corollary 1 is that the separability result by Ordover and Phelps (1979) continues to apply under a fairly general for-
mulation of the relative consumption concerns, which allow for both the keeping up and catching up with the Joneses
mechanisms.22
To see the intuition behind this result, note ﬁrst that a time-dependent lump-sum tax element would in a ﬁrst-best world
handle intertemporal allocation issues efﬁciently, such that capital income taxes are not needed (as we  saw in Section 3.2).
In a second-best world, the additional question is whether (and if so how) the government may  relax the self-selection
constraint through capital income taxation, i.e., by exploiting that the low-ability type might value the tradeoff between
present and future consumption in a different way than the mimicker. With a common utility function in the sense of
Corollary 1, the only reason why this tradeoff may  differ between the mimicker and the low-ability type is that the mimicker
is more productive and, therefore, enjoys more leisure than the low-ability type. However, since leisure separability means
that the labor supply does not directly affect the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, it
follows that the mimicker and low-ability type will face the same intertemporal consumption tradeoff, in which case it is
no longer possible to relax the self-selection constraint by distorting the savings behavior.23 This is so whether the model
incorporates positional externalities or not.
4.3. Optimal second-best taxation with time-varying degrees of positionalityLet us ﬁnally – as we  also did in Section 3.3 – relax the stationarity assumptions (assumptions (i)–(iv)). While the policy
rules will be more complex, we are still able to show some important ﬁndings for how the relative consumption concerns
21 The government may  relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the mimicker and the low-ability type differ with respect to the marginal
rate  of substitution between present and future consumption (in which case ı1t /= 0), whereas no such option exists with regard to the marginal capital
income tax rate of the high-ability type (ı2t = 0).
22 The Ordover and Phelps (1979) result can also be seen as an intertemporal analog to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result, saying that under optimal
nonlinear income taxation, differentiated consumption taxes are not needed under leisure separability.
23 The result that optimal capital income tax rates are zero under leisure separability (while typically non-zero otherwise) in an OLG model has also been
derived under optimal age-dependent (yet linear) labor income taxation; see Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Mathieu-Bolh (2006). Yet, none of these studies
address relative consumption concerns.
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ffect the optimal marginal income tax rates. We  show in the Appendix that a general characterization of the optimal
arginal income tax rates in the second best is given as (for i = 1, 2)
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = 	it −
MRSi,tz,c
twitNt
∂L
∂c¯t
, (28)
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) = ıit +
1
t+1rt+1Nt
[
∂L
∂c¯t
− MRS
i,t
c,x
1 + t+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
]
, (29)
here we have used the short notations 	it and ı
i
t deﬁned above. Eqs. (28) and (29) are straightforward generalizations of
he corresponding ﬁrst-best formulas given by Eqs. (19) and (20).
To be able to say more about the relationship between the relative consumption concerns and the marginal income tax
ates, we must explore the positionality effect in more detail. By using the expressions for the differences in the degree of
urrent (˛dt ) and intertemporal (ˇ
d
t ) positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type in period t, as given by Eqs.
24a) and (24b), together with the short notations
At+k =
Nt+kt+k[˛dt+k − ¯˛ t+k]
1 − ¯˛ t+k
,
Bt+k =
Nt+k+1t+k+1[ˇdt+k+1 − ¯ˇ t+k+1]
1 − ¯˛ t+k
,
e obtain the following second-best analog to Eq. (18):
∂L
∂c¯t
= At + Bt +
∞∑
k=1
[At+k + Bt+k]
k∏
j=1
¯ˇ
t+j
1 − ¯˛ t+j−1
. (30)
q. (30) extends Eq. (25) to the case where neither the degrees of positionality, nor the population and interest rate, are
necessarily) constant over time. We  can see that Eq. (30) has the same structure as Eq. (18) above, with the exception
hat the terms − ¯˛ t+k and − ¯ˇ t+k+1 in Eq. (18) are here replaced with ˛dt+k − ¯˛ t+k and ˇdt+k+1 − ¯ˇ t+k+1, respectively. The only
mportant difference between Eqs. (25) and (30) is that we can no longer make use of the (analytically convenient) time-
nclusive degrees of positionality in the same way as before. As a consequence, although comparisons with other people’s
ast consumption (the catching up motive) give rise to the same qualitative policy implications as those associated with
omparisons with other people’s current consumption (the keeping up motive), the welfare consequences of intertemporal
onsumption comparisons are, in general, much more complex than those associated with atemporal consumption com-
arisons. This is seen by recognizing that in the special case without intertemporal consumption comparisons, i.e., when
¯ t = ˇdt = 0 for all t, Eq. (30) reduces to
∂L
∂c¯t
= −Ntt
¯˛ t − ˛dt
1 − ¯˛ t ,
or all t, which takes exactly the same form as Eq. (25) above.
From Eq. (30), we can derive the following result regarding the conditions for when the sign of the positionality effect is
nambiguously negative:
emma  1. If, from period t and onwards, the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker on average, or if the
ositionality differences are sufﬁciently small, in any of the following senses:
(i)
Ntt˛dt +Nt+1t+1ˇdt+1
1− ¯˛ t +
∞∑
k=1
Nt+kt+k˛dt+k+Nt+k+1t+k+1ˇ
d
t+k+1
1− ¯˛ t+k
k∏
j=1
¯ˇ
t+j
1− ¯˛ t+j−1 ≤ 0,
(ii) ˛d
t+k < ¯˛ t+k and ˇ
d
t+k+1 <
¯ˇ
t+k+1 ∀k ≥ 0,
(iii) ˛d
t+k ≤ 0 and ˇdt+k+1 ≤ 0 ∀k ≥ 0,
then increased reference consumption in period t reduces the welfare.
Given that the individual degrees of positionality (both in the current and intertemporal dimensions) are always between
ero and one, (i) gives a sufﬁcient condition for when increased reference consumption in period t leads to lower welfare.
et, condition (i) is not necessary, since the terms in Eq. (30) that solely reﬂect the average degrees of positionality (i.e., the
ure externality terms) contribute to lower welfare as well. Condition (ii) is not necessary either, since ∂L/∂c¯t can clearly be
egative even if (ii) does not hold for some k. Note ﬁnally that condition (iii), which we  refer to because of its straightforward
nterpretation, is actually redundant since it implies condition (ii).
By combining Lemma  1 with Eq. (28), we obtain the following result:
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Proposition 5. If any of the conditions in Lemma  1 hold, so that increased reference consumption leads to lower welfare, ceteris
paribus, then the positionality effect in period t contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rates for both ability types
in period t
The interpretation of Proposition 5 is straightforward. If the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker
on average, or if loosely speaking the positionality differences are sufﬁciently small, and given that the individual degrees
of positionality are always between zero and one, then we obtain from Eq. (30) that ∂L/∂c¯t < 0. As such, Proposition 5
also extends the result of Oswald (1983) – that “marginal tax rates are higher than in the conventional model when the
population is predominantly jealous” (page 82) – to a model with consumption comparisons over time.24
Similarly, by combining Lemma  1 with Eq. (29), we can derive the following result for how positional concerns contribute
to the marginal capital income tax rates:
Proposition 6. Suppose that any of the conditions in Lemma  1 hold, so that increased reference consumption leads to lower
welfare, ceteris paribus Then, if the preferences become less (more) positional over time in the sense that∣∣∣∣ ∂L∂c¯t
∣∣∣∣> (<) MRSi,tc,x(1 + t+1)
∣∣∣∣ ∂L∂c¯t+1
∣∣∣∣ ,
i.e., the positionality effect in period t dominates (is dominated by) the positionality effect in period t + 1, then the joint contri-
bution of the positionality effects in periods t and t + 1 is to decrease (increase) the marginal capital income tax rate for ability-type
i in period t + 1.
If Lemma  1 applies, such that the positionality effect is negative in all periods, the interpretation of the ﬁrst-best policy rule
for marginal capital income taxation in Eq. (20) carries over with some modiﬁcations to the second-best framework addressed
here. Therefore, if the positionality effect in period t dominates the corresponding effect in period t + 1, there is an incentive
for the government to discourage the consumption in period t relative to the consumption in period t + 1. The difference by
comparison with the ﬁrst-best policy analyzed in Section 3.3 is, of course, that the policy incentives analyzed here are due
to both externality correction and redistribution effects of positional concerns through the self-selection constraint. This
has been discussed at some length above. The analogous policy incentive to encourage the consumption in period t relative
to the consumption in period t + 1 arises if the positionality effect in period t + 1 dominates. Again, these insights follow
irrespective of whether the positional concerns are driven by the keeping up or catching up mechanism or a mix  between
them.
An interesting implication of the proposition is that it would be optimal with increasing marginal capital income taxation
over time in an economy where the preferences become more positional over time (i.e., if we tend to attach a higher value to
increased relative consumption than to increased absolute consumption as time passes). Such a pattern is actually broadly
consistent with some empirical evidence: Clark et al. (2008) analyze the impact of relative income on happiness and conclude
that the concern for relative income tends to increase as the average income in a country increases. Note also that we  can
interpret the component MRSi,tc,x/(1 + t+1) as the effective discount factor for ability-type i, which is used to discount the
positionality effect in period t + 1 to period t.
5. Results based on a Cobb–Douglas utility function
In order to more clearly illustrate some implications of the relative consumption comparisons for optimal income taxation,
let us assume that the population and interest rate are constant (as we  did several times above), but in addition consider
the following Cobb–Douglas utility function:
Uit = ki(zit)
kiz (cinet,t)
kc (xinet,t+1)
kx
, (31)
where ki, kiz, kc, kx > 0 are constants and k
i
z + kc + kx < 1; cinet,t and xinet,t+1 reﬂect what we may  think of as consumption net
of relative consumption concerns, when young and when old, for an individual of ability-type i born in period t, as deﬁned
below:
cinet,t = [1 − a − b]cit + a[cit − c¯t] + b[cit − c¯t−1] = cit − ac¯t − bc¯t−1, (32a)
xinet,t+1 = [1 − a′ − b′]xit+1 + a′[xit+1 − c¯t+1] + b′[xit+1 − c¯t] = xit+1 − a′c¯t+1 − b′c¯t . (32b)
By substituting Eqs. (32a) and (32b) into Eq. (31), we  obtain:
Uit = ki[zit]
kiz [cit − ac¯t − bc¯t−1]
kc [xit+1 − a′c¯t+1 − b′c¯t]
kx
. (33)
24 By “jealousy,” Oswald meant that an increase in the reference consumption leads to decreased utility for the individual consumer (as compared to
“altruism,” which has the opposite effect). He analyzed nonlinear taxation of commodities instead of income, and the result referred to above is based on
a  utility function that is separable in the reference measure; an assumption that limits the inﬂuence of the incentive constraint on the marginal tax rates.
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lthough the utility functions are allowed to differ between the ability types, through the parameters ki and kiz , the individual
egrees of current and intertemporal consumption positionality are clearly the same between types, and are also constant
ver time. The degrees of current consumption positionality when young and when old for each type are equal to a and a′,
espectively, whereas the corresponding degrees of intertemporal consumption positionality are given by b and b′.
We can then easily consider the special case where individuals only care about the keeping up with the Joneses type
f comparison, i.e., that only comparisons with others’ current consumption matter. This is the case where b = b′ = 0 above,
mplying that Eq. (33) reduces to
Uit = ki[zit]
kiz [cit − ac¯t]
kc [xit+1 − a′c¯t+1]
kx
eturning to the general case with both keeping and catching up with the Joneses preferences, we have from Eq. (26) that
he optimal marginal labor income tax rate for ability-type i is given by
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = 	it + [1 − 	it]
[
a + a′
2
+ b + b
′
2(1 + r)
]
, (34)
here the ﬁrst expression in brackets thus represents the average degree of current consumption positionality, and the
econd the (one period discounted) average degree of intertemporal consumption positionality. As before, 	it is used as
 short notation of the formula for marginal labor income taxation that would follow without any relative consumption
oncerns.
Regarding optimal capital income taxation, it is easy to see that the separability assumption in Corollary 1 above is fulﬁlled
y the utility function in Eq. (33). Therefore, we know that the optimal marginal capital income tax rate is zero for each
bility type and in all time periods, irrespective of the parameter values of the utility function.
.1. Orders of magnitude
Let us now brieﬂy discuss possible orders of magnitude of the optimal marginal income taxes. A couple of studies have
ttempted to measure the average degree of current consumption positionality, corresponding to (a + a′)/2 in Eq. (34).
ccording to the survey-experimental evidence of Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpízar
t al. (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007), the average degree of current consumption positionality appears to be in the order
f magnitude of 0.5. Wendner and Goulder (2008) argue, based on the existing empirical evidence, for a value between
.2 and 0.4, whereas evidence from happiness studies such as Luttmer (2005) suggests a much larger value in the order of
agnitude of 0.8.
There is less direct evidence regarding the average degree of intertemporal consumption positionality, corresponding to
b + b′)/2 in Eq. (34). Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) refer to a benchmark value used by Carroll et al. (1997), with a value of
 parameter that can be interpreted as an intertemporal degree of consumption positionality equal to 0.5.25 As a sensitivity
nalysis, they use a value of 0.8, based on Fuhrer (2000).
As an illustrative example, consider the case where 	it = 0.3 and where both the average degree of current consumption
ositionality and the average degree of intertemporal consumption positionality are also 0.3, i.e., 	it = (a + a′)/2 = (b +′)/2 = 0.3. Then, if the real interest rate between the periods is given by r = 1,26 it follows that the optimal marginal labor
ncome tax rate is equal to T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = 0.3 + 0.7[0.3 + 0.3/2] = 0.615. In other words, the optimal marginal labor income tax
ate would be above 60% rather than 30% as suggested by the standard tax formula.
While the underlying estimates of the current and intertermporal degrees of positionality presented above are highly
ncertain and can hardly be interpreted as completely independent of each other,27 it nevertheless seems as if their joint
ffect on the marginal labor income tax rates may  be substantial.
.2. Explicit treatment of habit formation in own consumption and relative consumption
Let us ﬁnally return to the most general utility function we started from, i.e., Eq. (1a), where people also compare their
onsumption when old with their own consumption when young, as well as their relative consumption (compared with
thers’ current consumption) when old with their relative consumption when young. Consider the following Cobb-Douglas
tility function:
ki kCUit = ki(zit) z (Cinet,t) , (35)
25 In Carroll et al. (1997), the reference consumption is not others’ average consumption one period earlier (since their study is not based on an OLG
odel), but instead a weighted average of others’ average consumption where the weight is larger the closer to the present the consumption takes place.
26 This corresponds to an annual real interest rate of slightly less than 2 percent if we assume 40 years between the periods.
27 We are not aware of any study that simultaneously attempts to estimate the average degree of current and intertemporal consumption positionality.
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where ki, kiz, kC > 0 are constants, k
i
z + kC < 1, and
Cinet,t = [1 − a − b + b′′ + b′′′]cit + a[cit − c¯t] + b[cit − c¯t−1] + [1 − a′ − b′ − b′′ − b′′′]xit+1 + a′[xit+1 − c¯t+1]
+b′[xit+1 − c¯t] + b′′[(xit+1 − cit)] + b′′′[(xit+1 − c¯t+1) − (cit − c¯t)]
= cit + xit+1 − bc¯t−1 − [a + b′ − b′′′]c¯t − [a′ + b′′′]c¯t+1
(36)
denotes the overall consumption net of relative consumption concerns. Clearly a, b, a′, b′, b′′, and b′′′ reﬂect, respectively, the
importance of comparisons with others’ present consumption when young, comparisons with others’ previous consumption
when young, comparisons with others’ present consumption when old, comparisons with others’ previous consumption
when old, comparisons with one’s own previous consumption when old, and ﬁnally comparisons with one’s own previous
relative consumption when old.
Yet, as suggested in Eqs. (1b) and (1c) above, Eq. (36) can be rewritten as a reduced form in terms of current and
intertemporal consumption comparisons as follows:
Cinet,t = [1 − a − b + b′′′]cit + [a − b′′′][cit − c¯t] + b[cit − c¯t−1] + [1 − a′ − b′ − b′′′]xit+1
+ [a′ + b′′′][xit+1 − c¯t+1] + b′[xit+1 − c¯t], (37)
where it is clear that the current and intertemporal degrees of positionality when young are given by a − b′′′ and b, respec-
tively. Correspondingly, the current and intertemporal degrees of positionality when old are given by a′ + b′′′ and b′. This
means that we can again use Eq. (26), implying also that the optimal marginal labor income taxes are given by Eq. (34).
Thus, not surprisingly, there is no effect on marginal taxation of comparisons with own previous consumption. Moreover,
although the interpretations of the concepts of current and intertemporal degrees of positionality have to be modiﬁed due
to concerns for changes in relative consumption over time, these effects cancel out such that there is no effect on optimal
taxation.
6. Conclusion
The present paper simultaneously recognizes three mechanisms behind relative consumption concerns: comparisons
with (i) other people’s current consumption (keeping up with the Joneses), (ii) own  past consumption (habit formation), and
(iii) other people’s past consumption (catching up with the Joneses). We  are not aware of any previous normative economic
analysis in such a setting.
We  start by deriving a ﬁrst-best tax policy to correct for the positional externalities in the case where the government
is able to redistribute through lump-sum instruments. We  show that comparisons with one’s own past consumption do
not affect the optimal policy rules, since such comparisons are internalized by each individual (although internal habit
formation may, of course, affect the levels of marginal income tax rates), whereas comparisons with other people’s current
and past consumption generate positional externalities. In a stationary regime where the degrees of positionality are time-
invariant, the optimal tax policy is derived in terms of the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality, which
is essentially the sum of the average degree of current consumption positionality and the average degree of intertemporal
consumption positionality. Results derived in earlier literature such as Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Dupor and Liu (2003)
follow as special cases of our ﬁrst-best model. We  also show that the optimal marginal labor income tax rates become larger
the more positional people are on average, in terms of the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality.
The second-best analysis carried out in Section 4 is based on the two-type optimal income tax model with asymmetric
information between the government and the private sector. In this case, the net effects of relative consumption concerns
also depend on whether the low-ability type is more or less positional (broadly speaking) than the mimicker. The reason is
that this determines whether an increase in the reference consumption works to relax or tighten the self-selection constraint.
If the degrees of positionality are constant over time, there are no direct effects of relative consumption concerns on the
marginal capital income tax rates; in a second-best setting, such concerns will, nevertheless, affect the marginal capital
income tax structure through the self-selection constraint. We  are also able to reproduce the well-known result of Ordover
and Phelps (1979) for when there should be no capital income taxes on the margin, in a model where people compare their
own current consumption with several different measures of reference consumption.
When we generalize the model to allow for time variation also with regard to the positionality degrees, the population
size, and the interest rate, the optimal policy responses become considerably more complex and the optimal policy rules
are no longer possible to express in a simple way  in terms of time-inclusive positionality degrees. This applies both to the
ﬁrst-best and the second-best model. Yet, we  were able to obtain important ﬁndings regarding the qualitative effects of
positional concerns on the optimal marginal income tax rates, and in particular, when such concerns unambiguously work
to increase or decrease these tax rates.Finally we illustrate with a Cobb–Douglas functional form and show, based on parameter estimates from the literature,
that positional preferences of both the keeping up with the Joneses and catching up with the Joneses types substantially
increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates for both types. Since the leisure separability conditions are fulﬁlled for
this form, the optimal marginal capital income tax rates are consequently zero for both types.
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We  believe that the research area consisting of normative economic analysis when relative consumption matters is still
nderexplored. Examples of important issues that remain to be analyzed include multi-country settings, public provision of
rivate (non-positional) goods, public good provision in a dynamic economy, and long-term social discounting.
ppendix.
To save space, we have chosen to derive the more general results ﬁrst, such that the results following from more restrictive
ormulations of the model appear as special cases.
abor Income Taxation: derivation of Eqs. (19) and (28)
Consider the tax formula for the low-ability type. By combining Eqs. (23a) and (23b), we obtain
u1t,z
u1t,c
[
tuˆ
2
t,c + tn1t −
n1t
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
]
= tuˆ2t,z + tn1t w1t . (A1)
y substituting T
′
t (w
1
t l
1
t )w
1
t = w1t − u1t,z/u1t,c from Eq. (6) into Eq. (A1) and rearranging, we obtain Eq. (28) for the low-ability
ype. The corresponding formula for the high-ability type can be derived in the same general way  by combining Eqs. (6),
23d) and (23e). Eq. (19) follows as the special case where t = 0.
apital income taxation: derivation of Eqs. (20) and (29)
Consider ﬁrst the formula for the low-ability type. By combining Eqs. (23b) and (23c), we  obtain
MRS1,tc,x
[
tuˆ
2
t,x + t+1n1t −
n1t
Nt+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
]
= tuˆ2t,c + tn1t −
n1t
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
. (A2)
e  can then use Eqs. (7) and (23g) to derive MRS1,tc,x = 1 + rt+1 − rt+1˚
′
t+1(s
1
t rt+1) and  t =  t+1[1 + rt+1], respectively. Substi-
uting into Eq. (A2) and rearranging, we obtain Eq. (29) for the low-ability type. We  can derive the corresponding expression
or the high-ability type in the same general way by combining Eqs. (7), (23e), (23f) and (23g). Eq. (20) follows as the special
ase where t−1 = t = 0.
erivation of Eqs. (15), (18), (25) and (30)
Consider ﬁrst Eq. (30). By using Eq. (22), we can derive
∂L
∂c¯t
=
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nit−1U
i
t−1)
nit−1u
i
t−1,c¯t +
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,c¯t
+
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nit+1U
i
t+1)
nit+1u
i
t+1,c¯t + t−1[u
2
t−1,c¯t − uˆ
2
t−1,c¯t ] + t[u
2
t,c¯t
− uˆ2t,c¯t ] + t+1[u
2
t+1,c¯t − uˆ
2
t+1,c¯t ]. (A3)
rom Eqs. (1c) and (1d), we have
uit,c = vit,c + vit,cit−c¯t
+ vi
t,cit−c¯t−1
,
uit,x = vit,x + vit,xi
t+1−c¯t+1
+ vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t
,
uit,c¯t = −v
i
t,cit−c¯t
− vi
t,xi
t+1−c¯t
,
uit,c¯t−1 = −v
i
t,cit−c¯t−1
,
uit,c¯t+1 = −v
i
t,xi
t+1−c¯t+1
,
ouit,c¯t = −˛
i,c
t u
i
t,c − ˇi,xt+1uit,x, (A4)
uit,c¯t−1 = −ˇ
i,c
t u
i
t,c, (A5)
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uit,c¯t+1 = −˛
i,x
t+1u
i
t,x, (A6)
which substituted into Eq. (A3) imply
∂L
∂c¯t
= −
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nit−1U
i
t−1)
nit−1˛
i,x
t u
i
t−1,x −
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nit[˛
i,c
t u
i
t,c + ˇi,xt+1uit,x]
−
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nit+1U
i
t+1)
nit+1ˇ
i,c
t+1u
i
t+1,c + t−1[−˛2,xt u2t−1,x + ˆ˛ 2,xt uˆ2t−1,x]
+ t[−˛2,ct u2t,c − ˇ2,xt u2t+1,x + ˆ˛ 2,ct uˆ2t,c + ˆˇ 2,xt+1uˆ2t,x] + t+1[−ˇ
2,c
t+1u
2
t+1,c + ˆˇ 2,ct+1uˆ2t+1,c]. (A7)
From Eqs. (23b), (23c), (23e) and (23f), we have
∂W
∂(n1t U
1
t )
n1t u
1
t,c = tuˆ2t,c + tn1t −
n1t
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
, (A8)
∂W
∂(n2t U
2
t )
n2t u
2
t,c = −tu2t,c + tn2t −
n2t
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
, (A9)
∂W
∂(n1t−1U
1
t−1)
n1t−1u
1
t−1,x = t−1uˆ2t−1,x + tn1t−1 −
n1t−1
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
, (A10)
∂W
∂(n2t−1U
2
t−1)
n2t−1u
2
t−1,x = −t−1u2t−1,x + tn2t−1 −
n2t−1
Nt
∂L
∂c¯t
. (A11)
By substituting Eqs. (A8)–(A11) into Eq. (A7), and collecting terms, we obtain
∂L
∂c¯t
= ∂L
∂c¯t+1
¯ˇ
t+1
1− ¯˛ t −Ntt
¯˛ t
1 − ¯˛ t −Nt+1t+1
¯ˇ
t+1
1 − ¯˛ t +
t−1uˆ2t−1,x
1 − ¯˛ t [ ˆ˛
2,x
t − ˛1,xt ] +
tuˆ2t,c
1 − ¯˛ t [ ˆ˛
2,c
t − ˛1,ct ] +
tuˆ2t,x
1 − ¯˛ t [
ˆˇ 2,x
t+1 − ˇ
1,x
t+1]
+
t+1uˆ2t+1,c
1 − ¯˛ t [
ˆˇ 2,c
t+1 − ˇ
1,c
t+1] =
1
1 − ¯˛ t
[
¯ˇ
t+1
∂L
∂c¯t+1
+ Ntt[˛dt − ¯˛ t] + Nt+1t+1[ˇdt+1 − ¯ˇ t+1]
]
, (A12)
where we have used the short notations adt and ˇ
d
t as deﬁned earlier. Using the short notations
At =
Ntt[˛dt − ¯˛ t]
1 − ¯˛ t ,
Bt =
Nt+1t+1[ˇdt+1 − ¯ˇ t+1]
1 − ¯˛ t ,
ϕt =
¯ˇ
t+1
1 − ¯˛ t ,
the recursive Eq. (A12) can more conveniently be rewritten and expanded as
∂L
∂c¯t
= At + Bt + ϕt ∂L
∂c¯t+1
= At + Bt + ϕt
[
At+1 + Bt+1 + ϕt+1
∂L
∂c¯t+2
]
= At + Bt + ϕt
[
At+1 + Bt+1 + ϕt+1
[
At+2 + Bt+2 + ϕt+2
∂L
∂c¯t+3
]]
= At + Bt + [At+1 + Bt+1]ϕt + [At+2 + Bt+2]ϕtϕt+1 + [At+3 + Bt+3]ϕtϕt+1ϕt+2...
∞∑ i∏
. (A13)= At + Bt +
i=1
[At+i + Bt+i]
j=1
ϕt+j−1
Substituting back ϕt = ¯ˇ t+1/[1 − ¯˛ t] into Eq. (A13) implies Eq. (30). Eq. (18) follows as the special case where t = 0 for all t.
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Finally, by adding assumptions (i)–(iv) (i.e., i. Nt = N; (ii) ¯˛ t = ¯˛  and ¯ˇ t = ¯ˇ ;  (iii) rt = r; and iv. ¯˛ dt = ¯˛ d and ¯ˇ dt = ¯ˇ d, for all
), Eq. (30) reduces to Eq. (25) and Eq. (18) reduces to Eq. (15). To see this, use assumptions i–iv in Eq. (30) to derive
∂L
∂c¯t
= Nt
1 − ¯˛
[
˛d − ¯˛  + ˇ
d − ¯ˇ
1 + r
] ∞∑
i=0
[
¯ˇ
(1 − ¯˛ )(1 + r)
]i
= Nt ˛
d − ¯˛  + (ˇd − ¯ˇ )/(1 + r)
1 − ¯˛ − ¯ˇ /(1 + r)
.
he second line presupposes that 0 < ¯ˇ < (1 − ¯˛ ) (1 + r), such that the series converges. Using the deﬁnitions of ¯ and d
ives Eq. (25).
erivation of Eqs. (16) and (26)
Consider ﬁrst Eq. (26) for the low-ability type. By combining Eqs. (25) and (28), we  obtain
T
′
t (w
1
t l
1
t ) =
∗t
w1t n
1
t
[MRS1,tz,c − MRˆS2,tz,c ] −
MRS1,tz,c
w1t
d − ¯
1 − ¯ . (A14)
hen, by using MRS1,tz,c/w
1
t = 1 − T
′
t (w
1
t l
1
t ) and rearranging, we  obtain Eq. (26) for the low-ability type. The corresponding
arginal income tax rate for the high-ability type is derived in a similar way. Eq. (16) follows as the special case where t = 0.
erivation of Eqs. (17) and (27)
Consider ﬁrst Eq. (27). Substituting Eq. (25), for period t and period t + 1, into Eq. (29), we  obtain
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) = ıit +
1
r
d − ¯
1 − ¯
[
t
t+1
− MRSi,tc,x
]
, (A15)
or i = 1, 2, where we have used the short notations ı1t and ı
2
t as deﬁned earlier. Using MRS
i,t
c,x = 1 + r − r˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) together
ith  t/ t+1 = 1 + r in Eq. (A15) and rearranging, we  obtain Eq. (27). Eq. (17) follows as the special case where t−1 = t = 0.
rief derivations of Eqs. (16′) and (17′)
The utility function facing ability-type i of generation t is given by
Uit = vit(cit, zit, xit+1, cit − c¯
young
t , x
i
t+1 − x¯oldt+1, cit − c¯
young
t−1 , x
i
t+1 − x¯oldt )
= uit(cit, zit, xit+1, c¯
young
t , c¯
young
t−1 , x¯
old
t+1, x¯
old
t )
. (A16)
he resource constraint is given by Eq. (12) and the Lagrangian by Eq. (13), in which the social welfare function is based on
q. (A16) instead of on Eqs. (1). The social ﬁrst-order conditions for the hours of work and the capital stock remain as in Eqs.
14a) and (14d), respectively, while the social ﬁrst-order conditions for private consumption change to (where nt = n1t + n2t )
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,c − tnit +
nit
nt
∂L
∂c¯youngt
= 0, (A17)∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,x − t+1nit +
nit
nt+1
∂L
∂x¯oldt+1
= 0. (A18)
y using Eqs. (6), (7), (14a), (14d), (A17) and (A18), we  can derive the following analogs to Eqs. (19) and (20):
T
′
t (w
i
tl
i
t) = −
MRSi,tz,c
twitnt
∂L
∂c¯youngt
, (A19)
˚
′
t+1(s
i
trt+1) =
1
t+1rt+1nt
[
∂L
∂c¯youngt
− MRSi,tc,x
∂L
∂x¯oldt+1
]
. (A20)
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Note also that
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∂c¯youngt
=
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∂W
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i
t)
nitu
i
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t −
2∑
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∂L
∂x¯oldt+1
=
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i=1
∂W
∂(nitU
i
t)
nitu
i
t,x¯old
t+1
+
2∑
i=1
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∂(nit+1U
i
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nit+1u
i
t+1,x¯old
t+1
= −
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i=1
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i
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i
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i,old
t+1 −
2∑
i=1
∂W
∂(nit+1U
i
t+1)
nit+1u
i
t+1,xˇ
i,old
t+2 . (A22)
Substituting Eqs. (A17) and (A18) and their counterparts for generation t + 1 into Eqs. (A21) and (A22), rearranging, and using
the variants of assumptions (i)–(iii) discussed in Section 3.4 give
∂L
∂c¯youngt
= −tn ¯
young
1 − ¯young , (A23)
∂L
∂x¯oldt+1
= −t+1n
¯old
1 − ¯old . (A24)
Substituting Eqs. (A23) and (A24) into Eqs. (A19) and (A20) gives Eqs. (16′) and (17′).
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